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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 MBFR VIENNA 0024

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES
OF FEBRUARY 3, 1976

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0023

THE FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF FEBRUARY
3, 1976. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH 8 CONTAINING
SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

9. KHLESTOV AS HOST WELCOMED THE PARTICIPANTS. HE
WISHED SUCCESS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1976 AND SAID HE
HOPED 1976 WOULD BE A DECISIVE YEAR FOR THE VIENNA TALKS
AS CANADIAN REP HAD SAID IN HIS JANUARY 30 PLENARY PRESEN-
TATION. KHLESTOV SAID THAT EASTERN REPS HAD USED THE
RECESS TO CONSULT IN CAPITALS AND TO CARRY OUT A COMPREHEN-
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SIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING

THE REASONS FOR LACK OF PROGRESS THUS FAR. THE MOST RECENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN HELD IN A BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAD ENABLED PARTICIPANTS TO GET A BETTER IDEA OF EACH OTHERS' VIEWS. HOWEVER, AFTER MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATION, ANY EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION COULD NOT CONCEAL THE FACT THAT NO REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS AND GIVE THEIR EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV THEN CALLED ON POLISH REP TO PRESENT THIS EVALUATION.

10. POLISH REP SAID THE EASTERN EVALUATION OF THE REASONS FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS WELL KNOWN AND HAD BEEN FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED. IT WAS BASED ON CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE POSITIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AND OF A COMPARISON OF THESE POSITIONS WITH OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, INCLUDING THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE END OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

11. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT THE NOVEMBER 8, 1973 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT FULLY CORRESPONDED TO THESE CRITERIA AND PROVIDED A BROAD PROGRAM FOR MUTUAL AND SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OVER A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO ANYONE. AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS WOULD LOWER THE LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY MORE THAN 15 PERCENT AND WOULD INCREASE THE SECURITY OF ALL. SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE.

12. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES BEYOND THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, INITIATIVES WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND HAD BEEN AIMED AT ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THESE INITIATIVES INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS WHICH WERE STILL ON THE TABLE: FIRST, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES BY 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE

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TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. THE US AND USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 10,000 MEN RESPECTIVELY AND, FOR EXAMPLE THE FORCES OF THE FRG AND POLAND WOULD EACH BE REDUCED BY 5,000 MEN, WITH THE REMAINING 5,000 MEN TO BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AGREEMENT ON AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE EASY. IT WOULD BE A STEP ON THE WAY TO THE COMMON GOAL. THIS EASTERN POSITION TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN DESIRE

THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD UNDERTAKE MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS.

13. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, SECOND, AGREEMENT ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION BY ALL PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ENHANCE CONFIDENCE AND DEMONSTRATE THE POLITICAL WILL TO PUT A STOP TO THE FURTHER GROWTH OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE REFUSAL OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL UP TO NOW RAISED THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE NATO COUNTRIES INTENDED TO LIMIT THE GROWTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA.

14. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, THIRD, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS OF ITS DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH REQUIRED PRIOR REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND USSR IN TWO CONSECUTIVE YEARS. THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AFTER THE US AND THE USSR IN EACH OF THESE STAGES. THIS PROPOSAL TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN DESIRE THAT THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

15. POLISH REP SAID HE WAS MENTIONING THESE PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO SHOW THE WEST THAT EASTERN REPS CONTINUED TO CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS AS QUITE VALID AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THESE PROPOSALS IMPORTANT AND WOULD WELCOME A WESTERN REASSESSMENT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A MORE PRODUCTIVE WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM.

16. UK REP THANKED KHLESTOV FOR HIS WELCOME. HE SAID WESTERN REPS LIKE EASTERN REPS SHARED THE SAME HOPE THAT 1976 WOULD ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO DEMONSTRATE SOME PROGRESS,
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IN PART AS A REWARD FOR THE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS MADE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE RESULTS THUS FAR HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH SUCCESS, BUT THEY HAD ENABLED ALL TO GET A BETTER IDEA OF EACH OTHERS' VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

17. UK REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO THE SUMMARY BY THE POLISH REP OF THE VARIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS WESTERN REPS HAD OF COURSE AT VARIOUS TIMES EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS ON THESE PROPOSALS. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS WOULD UNDERSTAND IT IF ON THE PRESENT OCCASION UK REP DID NOT IMMEDIATELY REPEAT THESE VIEWS. UK REP SAID HE WOULD INSTEAD PREFER TO RETURN TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WHICH WESTERN REPS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO DISCUSS IN THE FIRST PLACE. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, UK REP CONTINUED THAT, ON DECEMBER 16, WESTERN REPS HAD MADE AN IMPORTANT NEW OFFER DESIGNED TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND BRING AGREEMENT. THE ALLIES HAD ADDED TO THEIR PREVIOUS REDUCTION PROPOSALS AN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS OFFER WAS A SUBSTANTIAL ONE OF GREAT MILITARY IMPORTANCE.

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18. UK REP SAID THE WEST WAS OFFERING ON A ONE-TIME BASIS TO REDUCE A LARGE NUMBER OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, AND TO REDUCE THOSE US NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE AREA WITH THE GREATEST

RANGE AND STRIKE CAPABILITY. THE ALLIES WERE IN ADDITION PREPARED TO APPLY SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS TO THE RESIDUAL LEVELS OF WITHDRAWN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF THESE TYPES. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO WITHDRAW AND LIMIT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. THUS, THE ALLIES HAD INTRODUCED A MAJOR NEW FACTOR INTO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE A DECISIVE MOVE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND THE ASSOCIATED RISK OF ESCALATION. WHEN PUT INTO EFFECT, THE OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH WOULD LEAD TO A STABLE SITUATION IN WHICH THESE RISKS WOULD BE MINIMIZED.

19. UK REP SAID THAT THE WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL MET IMPORTANT EASTERN CONCERNS; THROUGHOUT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED FOR REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. THE ALLIES HAD NOW PROPOSED A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, AND WITHOUT ASKING FOR INCREASED REDUCTIONS FROM THE EAST.

20. UK REP SAID THAT TO ACCOMPLISH THE AIM OF REDUCING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT AND ESCALATION, THE REDUCTION PACKAGES ON EACH SIDE NEED NOT BE IDENTICAL IN COMPOSITION. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONSIDERED THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD CONSIST OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND SOVIET TANKS, WITH THE COMPOSITION OF REDUCTIONS ON BOTH SIDES A DIFFERENT ONE. THIS WAS WHAT ALLIED REPS CALLED A "MIXED PACKAGE." IN A MIXED PACKAGE OF THIS KIND, WHERE THE COMPOSITION OF THE REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE WAS DIFFERENT, ONE HAD TO CONSIDER THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE AS A WHOLE, RATHER THAN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS. WHEN EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE REDUCTIONS THE WEST PROPOSED, THE WEIGHT OF THE LIMITATIONS THE ALLIES WOULD ACCEPT, AND THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE FORCES OF THE USSR -- WHOSE TERRITORY ADJOINED THE AREA -- WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SIMILAR LIMITATIONS, THEN THE WEST WAS OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS IT WAS ASKING FOR: THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY PLUS A COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE REMAINING
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REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH IN PHASE II THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED.

21. UK REP SAID THAT, BECAUSE WHAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING TO DO ON ITS SIDE WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT THE ALLIES WERE ASKING FOR FROM THE EAST, IT COULD NOT BE CONTENDED THAT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD CHANGE THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE
OF THE WEST. THE ALLIES' OBJECTIVE WAS AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME WHICH

WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY. THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSALS THE WEST HAD MADE. NEITHER SIDE WOULD DERIVE UNILATEAL ADVANTAGE FROM AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. IT WAS BECAUSE THE ALLIES WERE OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS THEY WERE ASKING FOR THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE WEST HAD PROVIDED AN EQUITABLE AND PRACTICAL BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD REGARD THE EASTERN REACTION TO THE ALLIED PROPOSALS AS A VALID TEST OF THE EAST'S WILLINGNESS TO AGREE ON EFFECTIVE, PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING DETENTE IN EUROPE.

22. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF UK REP'S STATEMENT, HE WISHED TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS CONCERNING THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. AFTER HAVING CONSIDERED THIS POSITION OBJECTIVELY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE, EASTERN REPS HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WESTERN POSITION CONTRADICTED BOTH AS A WHOLE AND IN INDIVIDUAL RESPECTS THE POINTS AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, AGREEMENT ON WHICH HAD ENABLED PARTICIPANTS TO EMBARK ON THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEAL ONCE AGAIN WITH THE FACTORS WHICH FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS HAD IMPEDED PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA TALKS.

23. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT THE FIRST OF THESE WAS THE EFFORT OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO ALTER THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE IN THEIR OWN FAVOR, AND, DESPITE WHAT UK REP HAD JUST SAID ON THIS POINT, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. THIS PRECISE OBJECTIVE WAS PURSUED BY THE WEST IN DEMANDING SO-CALLED ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH THE
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SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE MORE THAN TWICE AS MUCH AS THE NATO STATES. SUCH AN APPROACH COULD NOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. PARTICIPANTS MUST NEGOTIATE ON AN EQUAL BASIS SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WINNERS AND NO LOSERS AND THE RESULT WOULD BE THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT TRYING TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OR INSISTING THAT OTHERS UNDERTAKE OBLIATIONS THEY WERE NOT READY TO ASSUME THEMSELVES. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ADOPT THIS APPROACH.

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24. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT ANOTHER OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS WAS THE OBSTINATE REFUSAL OF CANADA AND THE OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO DECLARE WHAT REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS THEY WERE READY TO ASSUME. SUCH A SITUATION COULD NOT BE VIEWED AS NORMAL AFTER TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATION. FOR THEIR PART, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD INDICATED WHAT OBLIGATIONS THEY WERE READY TO ASSUME IN PUTTING FORWARD THEIR NOV 8, 1973 DRAFT AGREEMENT. THEY HAD MADE CLEAR WHAT REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS EACH WAS READY TO ASSUME ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY.

25. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT THAT REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS COULD BE CARRIED OUT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. THIS IN TURN ENTAILED THE ASSUMPTION OF EQUAL OBLIGATIONS BY ALL. EACH PARTICIPANT WAS ENTITLED TO KNOW WHAT OBLIGATIONS, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN REPS WISHED TO APPEAL TO THE WEST TO CONSIDER THESE FACTS AND TO DRAW THE RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS. IF PARTICIPANTS WERE GUIDED BY THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD
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REALIZE THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN CLEAR AND CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. HOW COULD PARTICIPANTS REACH AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS WHEN IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHAT OBLIGATIONS OF ALL WOULD BE? CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WISHED IN THIS CONTEXT TO CALL ON WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE CONCRETE STEPS WHICH COULD MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD.

26. NETHERLANDS REP SAID CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD JUST REPEATED SOME EASTERN CRITICISMS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. HOWEVER, CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN HIS CRITICISM TO THE NEW AND IMPORTANT PROPOSALS THE WEST HAD MADE AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND. BUT HIS REMARKS IMPLIED THAT HIS CRITICISM DID REFER TO THIS NEW PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPS HAD ALREADY RECEIVED AN INDICATION OF THESE SAME POINTS AND ALSO OF OTHER CRITICISMS IN THE PLENARY STATEMENT MADE BY THE POLISH REP ON JAN 30. IT THEREFORE SEEMED USEFUL IN CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THESE POINTS. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD OBJECTED THAT THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS A LIMITED ONE BECAUSE IT PROVIDED FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ONLY. IT WAS CORRECT THAT REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS OF NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT A PART OF THE ALLIED OFFER. NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, DID THE WEST PROPOSE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF THE ARMAMENTS OF NON-SOVIET EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE WEST WAS UNWILLING FOR THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE OR LIMIT THEIR ARMAMENTS BECAUSE TO DO THIS WOULD PLACE THESE COUNTRIES AT TOO GREAT A DISADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, WHOSE COMPARABLE ARMAMENTS, LOCATED ON TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE AREA, WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. AS PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT, THE OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA WAS OF GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

27. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT THE EAST HAD ONCE AGAIN ALSO CRITICIZED THE WESTERN PHASED APPROACH. ALLIED REPS HAD FREQUENTLY EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION ON THIS POINT AND THE REASONS WHY THE WEST CONSIDERED THAT REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD BE BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS DID NOT NEED TO BE REPEATED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. MOREOVER, THE ALLIES HAD MADE SEVERAL
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IMPORTANT MODIFICATIONS TO THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL WHICH THE WEST CONSIDERED MET EASTERN CONCERNS ON THIS ISSUE. FIRST, ALL THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PARTICIPATE IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING. SECOND, THE WEST HAD PROPOSED THAT THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN

WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED AND THAT THE DURATION OF THIS PERIOD BE SPECIFIED IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT. THIRD, THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPATE IN A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES. FOURTH, THE WEST HAD PROPOSED THAT THERE BE A PROVISION FOR REVIEW, AFTER A SPECIFIED PERIOD, OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT AND OF THE RESULTS OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS UP TO THAT POINT.

28. NEGHERLANDS REP SAID THE EAST HAD AGAIN CRITICIZED THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. THE WEST HAD EXPLAINED WHY IT COULD NOT AGREE TO LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD RESTRICT ITS INTERNAL FUNCTIONING, AS NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS WOULD DO. WESTERN FORCES WERE ORGANIZED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A JOINT DEFENSE EFFORT, RATHER THAN TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY. THE OVERALL LIMIT ON THE TOTAL SIZE OF NATO ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA WHICH WEST PROPOSED WAS A MOST SIGNIFICANT OFFER. IT MEANT THAT THE TOTAL LEVEL OF WESTERN ACTIVE DUTY FORCES PERMITTED UNDER AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE LIMITED. THIS OFFER SHOULD MEET ANY GENUINE SECURITY INTERESTS THE EAST MIGHT HAVE. ANY CHANGES IN NATIONAL MANPOWER LEVELS THAT MIGHT OCCUR WITHIN SUCH A CEILING WOULD NOT INCREASE THE WEST'S OVERALL MILITARY CAPABILITIES. WESTERN REPS THEREFORE CONSIDERED THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON NATIONAL CEILINGS LACKED ANY JUSTIFICATION ON MILITARY GROUNDS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE INSISTENCE SEEMED TO ALLIED REPS TO BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED.

29. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, FINALLY, THE EAST HAD OBJECTED THAT THE WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS MADE DEPENDENT ON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE OVERALL WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH. EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THIS OVERALL APPROACH SOUGHT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. THE EAST IMPLIED THAT THE AUGMENTED WESTERN APPROACH STILL SOUGHT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. THIS WAS INCORRECT. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE

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WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM. WESTERN REPS CONSIDERED THIS FULLY JUSTIFIED. THE PROPOSED US NUCLEAR REDUCTION OF WARHEADS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WAS A HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT ADDITION TO THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PROPOSAL. WHEN THESE ELEMENTS WERE ADDED TO WHAT THE ALLIES ALREADY HAD PROPOSED, IT COULD NOT BE CONTESTED THAT THE TOTAL WESTERN OFFER WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT THE WEST WAS ASKING FROM THE EAST. THUS, IT WAS INCORRECT TO ASSERT THAT THERE WOULD BE A UNILATERAL WESTERN ADVANTAGE IN SUCH A REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

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FROM US REP MBFR

30. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, FOLLOWING PHASE II REDUCTIONS, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE EQUAL NUMBERS OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER COMBINED. THERE WAS NO UNILATERAL WESTERN ADVANTAGE IN SUCH PARITY. IF THERE WERE ANY ADVANTAGE, IT WAS TO THE EAST, DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD LARGE NUMBERS OF STROOPS STATIONED ON TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WHILE US FORCES MUST WITHDRAW OVER 5000 KILOMETERS. IN THE WESTERN MIXED-PACKAGE APPROACH, THE ALLIES WERE ASKING THE EAST TO REDUCE TANKS AND MORE MEN THAN THE WEST. HOWEVER, THE WEST WAS NOW PROPOSING TO ADD THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF US TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO ITS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THIS WAS WITHOUT ASKING FOR ANY INCREASE IN EASTERN REDUCTIONS. WHEN THIS NUCLEAR ELEMENT WAS ADDED TO WHAT THE ALLIES HAD ALREADY PROPOSED, WHAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING TO UNDERTAKE WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT IT WAS ASKING FROM THE EAST.

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31. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY UK REP AND NETHERLANDS REP ABOUT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 16, 1975, WHICH THESE REPS HAD AGAIN DISCUSSED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. FIRST, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO STATE THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DID INDICATE A CERTAIN MOVEMENT IN THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS HAD SHOWN ITSELF THROUGH THEIR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NEED TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN REDUCTIONS. AS WESTERN REPS KNEW, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAVORED INCLUDING IN REDUCTIONS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS EASTERN POSITION WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE DANGER SUCH WEAPONS PRESENTED FOR THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE. THIS EASTERN POSITION ALSO CONFORMED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER STIPULATED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD WORK OUT REDUCTIONS NOT ONLY OF MANPOWER BUT OF ARMAMENTS AS WELL. THIS HAD BEEN PUBLICALLY STATED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973. THEREFORE, THROUGH HAVING DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO INCLUDE IN REDUCTIONS NUCLEAR WEAPONS TOO, THAT IS TO SAY, A CERTAIN TYPE OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS MAINTAINED BY THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD AT LEAST TAKEN A STEP, THOUGH NOT SUFFICIENT, IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, A DIRECTION WHICH HAD BEEN LAID OUT IN THE AGREED COMUNIQUE MORE THAN TWO YEARS AGO.

32. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, AT THE SAME TIME, ONE COULD NOT BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE READINESS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTION OF A PORTION OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA HAD BEEN MADE DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE ENTIRE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD REPEATEDLY INDICATED THE UNACCEPTABLE CHARACTER OF THIS WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS. ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD REPEATED A NUMBER OF POINTS OF THIS SCHEME, TRYING TO PROVE THAT THIS APPROACH WAS WELL JUSTIFIED AND MIGHT EVEN GIVE MORE ADVANTAGE TO THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IF THEY AGREED TO ACCEPT IT. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD ONCE AGAIN HEARD ARGUMENTS DIRECTED TO THE DEFENSE OF

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ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN SCHEME, INCLUDING THE TWO-PHASE CHARACTER OF REDUCTIONS AND ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE SO-CALLED GEOGRPAHIC FACTOR AND OTHER ELEMENTS. ONCE

AGAIN, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD HEARD ARGUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COLLECTIVE CEILING PROVIDED FOR IN THE WESTERN SCHEME.

33. KHESTOV SAID HE DID NOT THINK IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO ONCE AGAIN REPEAT ON THE PRESENT OCCASION THE ARGUMENTS WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE IN DETAIL, ARGUMENTS WHICH SHOWED THE UNJUSTIFIED CHARACTER OF ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD ONCE AGAIN ANALYZED THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH AND HAD REPEATED IN SUMMARY FORM THE ARGUMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED BY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IN MORE DETAIL IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS. THIS CRITICISM PROVED INCONTESTABLY THAT THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AND THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS TO ENABLE THE NATO COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN UNILATEERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE. THIS WAS THE FIRST CONSIDERATION WHICH DICTATED THE EASTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL, WHICH HAD BEEN SUBMITTED UNDER THE CONDITION THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD AGREE WITH THE ENTIRE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME.

34. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO NOTE ONE FURTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL: THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT COVER THE MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HELD BY THE FORCES OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY JUSTIFIED THEIR CONVICTION THAT EACH OF THE GROUPINGS OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A WHOLE AND THAT ONE COULD NOT TAKE ISOLATED ELEMENTS OF THESE TWO GROUPINGS IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF EACH OF THEM. THIS THOUGHT WAS FULLY APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP IN CONNECTION WITH WHY THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL DID NOT COVER THE MEANS OF DELIVERY HELD BY OTHER NATO PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA WERE NOT CONVINCING FOR THE EAST AND EVEN SEEMED STRANGE. THIS APPROACH ALSO SEEMED INCORRECT TO THE EAST BECAUSE THE OTHER EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES -- POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR -- HAD ALREADY CLEARLY INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH REDUCTIONS. THE

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OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THESE COUNTRIES, NATURALLY, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, WOULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY IN THE AREA.

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 MBFR VIENNA 0024

FROM US REP MBFR

35. KHLESTOV SAID A FURTHER AGRUMENT PRESENTED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP ALSO SEEMED STRANGE. IN SPEAKING ABOUT MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT THE DISPOSAL OF WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD TRIED TO COMPARE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WHICH WERE HELD BY WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WITH FORCES MAINTAINED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WAS OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED SUCH AN APPROACH TO BE ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT. PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY REACHED AGREEMENT THAT, IN WORKING OUT MEASURES DIRECTED AT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES, THEY WOULD EVALUATE THE ARMED FORCES STATIONED INSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED IN THE REDUCTION AREA. HOWEVER, IF PARTICIPANTS FOLLOWED THE LOGIC PROPOSED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, THEY SHOULD BE COMPARING WHAT MIGHT BE REDUCED IN POLAND WITH WHAT MIGHT BE REDUCED IN, SAY, THE UNITED KINGDOM. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. PARTICIPANTS HAD ESTABLISHED AN AREA OF REDUCTIONS. PARTICIPANTS HAD TO FIND OUT WHAT FORCES WERE MAINTAINED IN THIS AREA AND

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WHAT FORCES WERE TO BE REDUCED FROM THESE FORCES. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN REPS HAD NOT YET HEARD ANY CONVINCING ARGUMENTS WHICH EXPLAINED TO THEM WHY THIS WESTERN PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERY HELD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

36. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, WHILE TAKING NOTE OF THIS ASPECT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, HE ALSO WISHED TO INDICATE THAT THE WESTERN SIDE HAD NOT GIVEN THE EAST CLARIFICATION ON THE TWO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: (A) WHAT TYPES OF MEANS OF DELIVERY WERE COVERED BY THE QUANTITY OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO BE WITHDRAWN; AND (B) IN REALITY, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES. INSTEAD, IT WOULD EVEN ALLOW FOR A CERTAIN INCREASE OF SUCH FORCES IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS. KHLESTOV SAID HE BELIEVED IN CONCLUSION THAT THE COMMENTS MADE BY EASTERN REPS DURING THIS SESSION DEMONSTRATED THE WEAKNESSES OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF 16 DEC 1975.

37. US REP SAID REMARKS MADE BY EASTERN REPS IN THE PRESENT SESSION AND BY THE POLISH REP IN HIS JAN 30 PLENARY STATEMENT HAD BEEN GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DEC 16. THESE GENERAL COMMENTS HAD BEEN QUITE NEGATIVE IN TONE. THIS NEGATIVE TONE WAS DISAPPOINTING. US REP BELIEVED IT SHOWED A FAILURE ON THE PART OF EASTERN REPS THUS FAR TO APPRECIATE THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. VIEWED OBJECTIVELY, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DEC 16 WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. IT PRESENTED A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS IN THIS RESPECT ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM ANY CHANGES EITHER SIDE HAD MADE IN THEIR POSITIONS UP TO THIS TIME. THIS WESTERN POSITION EXPRESSLY TOOK INTO ACCOUNT MAJOR CONCERNS WHICH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED.

38. US REP SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT, IN REMARKS MADE IN THE PRESENT SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD AGAIN ASSERTED THAT IT WAS THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. HE BELIEVED THAT FURTHER CAREFUL STUDY OF THE WESTERN DEC 16 PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY THE UK AND NETHERLANDS REPS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, SHOULD MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT THE WESTERN PURPOSE. THE REVISED AND AUGMENTED WESTERN PROPOSAL
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INVOLVED THE ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS BY THE TWO SIDES WHOSE TOTAL EFFECT WAS AT LEAST EQUAL. BECAUSE THE TOTAL EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REVISED WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS EQUITABLE AND AT LEAST EQUAL, IT COULD NOT OBJECTIVELY BE SAID THAT THE WEST WAS AIMING TO CHANGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP

OF FORCES WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL EUROPE OR TO SEEK UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE.

39. US REP SAID HE WAS SPEAKING HERE OF THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP
OF FORCES, GROUND AND AIR AS WELL AS ARMAMENTS. EASTERN REPS
WERE MISREADING THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE WESTERN MIXED PACKAGE
APPROACH. WESTERN REPS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT ANY SOLUTION WHICH
WOULD CODIFY THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN THE
AREA COULD NOT FORM THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT. IT WAS TO DEAL
WITH THIS PROBLEM THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD MOVED TO THE
MIXED PACKAGE CONCEPT. THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE TO GAIN UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE BUT TO DEAL WITH THE MAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEM WHICH
BLOCKED AGREEMENT. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT THEIR REVISED AND AUGMENTED PROPOSAL
EMBODYING THE MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH PROVIDED A REALISTIC
BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. WESTERN REPS ASKED THAT THE EAST GIVE
THIS PROPOSAL FURTHER CAREFUL STUDY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF
THE COMMENTS WESTERN REPS HAD MADE IN THE PRESENT SESSION.
WHEN EASTERN REPS HAD DONE THIS, WESTERN REPS WOULD IN DUE
COURSE EXPECT A POSITIVE REPLY.

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FROM US REP MBFR

40. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A FEW COMMENTS:. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ON THE PRESENT OCCASION PRESENTED THEIR RESULTS OF THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL. THEY HAD INDICATED WHERE THEY SAW A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN THIS PROPOSAL. THEY HAD THOROUGHLY AND WITH MANY SUBSTANTIATING ARGUMENTS INDICATED THE DRAWBACKS OF THIS PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS PROCEEDED FROM THE PREMISE THAT WESTERN REPS WOULD DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS FROM THEIR ANALYSIS. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, IN LISTENING TO THE US REP'S REMARKS, HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US REP HAD FORMULATED ONE OF THE IDEAS HE HAD EXPRESSED IN SUCH A WAY THAT ONE MIGHT BELIEVE THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS BASED ON THE DESIRE NOT TO CHANGE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE EVENT THAT THIS WAS TRUE, HE WISHED TO SAY THAT ONE MORE ELEMENT WAS EMERGING WHICH COULD HELP PARTICIPANTS BRING THEIR POSITIONS CLOSER AND WHICH COULD HELP THEIR WORK.

41. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO SAY IN CONCLUSION THAT IN THE
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PRESENT SITUATION THE SUCCESS OF THE CSCE CONFERENCE HAD OPENED UP AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO MAKE A RENEWED EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY FOR WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE FIRST, THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THE FRG, UK, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, CANADA AND LUXEMBOURG, SHOULD UNDERTAKE CONCRETE COMMITMENTS OF EQUAL VALUE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND SECOND, THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD COVER ALL ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NOT ONLY THEIR PERSONNEL BUT ALSO THEIR ARMAMENTS. THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH COMMITMENTS. THEREFORE, IT WAS THE WEST'S TURN TO KICK THE BALL. THE ANSWER OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THESE POINTS WOULD SHOW TO WHAT EXTENT THEIR STATEMENTS OF READINESS TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE CORRESPONDED TO THEIR ACTUAL POSITION. IN THE EVENT THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOWED ACTUAL READINESS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS AND THEIR AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE CONCRETE COMMITMENTS TOGETHER WITH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE FEASIBLE.

42. KHESTOV THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION BE HELD ON FEB 10TH. HE PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MAINTAIN THE SAME ORDER OF TREATMENT OF TOPICS AS IN THE PREVIOUS ROUND, ALTERNATING DISCUSSION OF GENERAL TOPICS WITH DISCUSSION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS.

43. IN ACCORDANCE WITH POSITION DEVELOPED IN AD HOC GROUP, US REP SAID IT WAS THE STRONG FEELING OF WESTERN REPS THAT MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE DEC 16TH WESTERN PROPOSAL AND THAT DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION SHOULD CONSEQUENTLY BE ON WHAT HAD BEEN CALLED GENERAL ISSUES. HE COULD ONLY BELIEVE AFTER THE DISCUSSION IN THE PRESENT SESSION THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN MAKING THEIR POSITION CLEAR TO THE EAST. HENCE, MORE DISCUSSION WAS NEEDED.

44. UK REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD INDEED MUCH MORE TO SAY ABOUT THIS SUBJECT.

45. KHLESTOV SAID, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL,
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EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD WESTERN DESIRE TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF MAIN ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUES DISCUSSED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALL QUESTIONS WHICH COME UNDER THE CATEGORY OF MAIN ISSUES. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT, IN THIS SENSE, ALL PREVIOUSLY MADE PROPOSALS WERE ON THE TABLE AND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DEC 16 AS WELL. HE DID NOT WISH WESTERN REPS TO GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EAST WAS TRYING TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL. BUT EASTERN REPS STILL FELT THEY SHOULD DEVOTE THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION TO FORCE DEFINITIONS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD STICK TO THE ORDER OF WORK ESTABLISHED IN THE LAST ROUND. THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE EASTERN REPS WERE ATTEMPTING TO DIMINISH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, BUT BECAUSE THIS WORKING ORDER SEEMED INTRINSICALLY REASONABLE. IN THE LAST ROUND, PARTICIPANTS REACHED AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS TWO CATEGORIES OF SUBJECTS IN PARALLEL. THE PRESENT SESSION HAD BEEN FULLY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS FALLING UNDER THE HEADING OF MAJOR ISSUES. IT WAS THEREFORE ONLY LOGICAL TO DISCUSS FORCE DEFINITIONS IN THE NEXT SESSION. A FURTHER FACTOR TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WAS THAT THE DEFINITION DISCUSSION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE MILITARY EXPERTS OF PARTICIPATING DELEGATIONS. MOREOVER, AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS ROUND, PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN ALL IN AGREEMENT THAT THE DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE WAS A USEFUL AND NECESSARY PART OF THE WORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE WERE THE REASONS WHY EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOW ESTABLISH A WORKING ORDER WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS IN THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION AND TO ALTERNATE THEREAFTER.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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FROM US REP MBFR

46. US REP SAID AS HE RECOLLECTED IT, PARTICIPANTS HAD WORKED OUT A SYSTEM OF ALTERNATING SESSIONS FOR USE IN THE PAST ROUND. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE CARRIED OVER TO THE PRESENT ROUND, BUT HAD ASSUMED THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DECIDE ON THIS LATER. IN THE INTERIM, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD MADE A MAJOR CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION. IT SEEMED TO WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT A GOOD DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL HAD NOT YET TAKEN PLACE. AL LARGE PART OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE PRESENT OCCASION HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO KNOWN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES RATHER THAN TO THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL. THIS WAS WHY WESTERN REPS THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE THE GENERAL DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT SESSION.

47. KHLESTOV COMMENTED THAT THE SITUATION WAS A PECULIAR ONE. DURING THE PREVIOUS ROUND, WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN THE ONES TO PRESS FOR MORE DISCUSSION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS. NOW, THESE ROLES WERE REVERSED. POLISH REP SAID THAT, DURING PAST DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS, IT HAD BEEN THE EASTERN

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IMPRESSION THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. IF THE TOPIC

HAD BEEN PUT ASIDE COMPLETELY, ONE MIGHT LOSE THE GROUND GAINED. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED IT TIMELY TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC IN THE NEXT SESSION.

48. KHESTOV SUGGESTED THAT A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE MIGHT BE TO DEVOTE THE FIRST HALF OF THE NEXT SESSION TO GENERAL QUESTIONS AND THE SECOND HALF TO DEFINITIONS. US REP SAID THIS WOULD PRESENT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OWING TO THE NEED TO PROVIDE FOR THE PRESENCE MILITARY EXPERTS. HE THOUGHT IT MORE REASONABLE TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION ON MAIN ISSUES AND THE THIRD SESSION ON DEFINITIONS. KHESTOV SAID HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE MILITARY EXPERTS TO PARTICIPATE DURING DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL TOPIC AS WELL AS DEFINITIONS IN A SESSION DEVOTED TO BOTH. AFTER ALL, NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WERE BEING DISCUSSED, AND THIS COULD BE USEFUL FOR THEM SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS COULD ALSO BE DIVIDED HALF AND HALF BETWEEN GENERAL QUESTIONS AND DEFINITIONS. US REP SAID THAT SPLITTING THE SESSIONS AND DEVOTING A HALF OF EACH SESSION TO TWO DIFFERENT TOPICS WOULD MAKE IT HARD TO GET INTO USEFUL DIALOGUE. IT MADE MORE SENSE TO DEVOTE A FULL SESSION TO GENERAL ISSUES AND THEN A FULL SESSION TO DEFINITIONS.

49. UK REP SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD CREATE A LOT OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS TO TRY TO DIVIDE A SESSION EQUALLY BETWEEN FORCE DEFINITIONS AND MAIN ISSUES.

50. POLISH REP SUGGESTED THAT THE TOPIC OF THE NEXT SESSION BE FORCE DEFINITIONS AND THAT THE TWO ENSUING SESSIONS BE DEVOTED TO GENERAL QUESTIONS. AFTER DISCUSSION AMONG THEMSELVES, WESTERN REPS AGREED TO THIS PROPOSAL ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NO AUTOMATIC CYCLE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, BUT RATHER THAT A DISCUSSION SHOULD BE HELD AT THE END OF THE THIRD SESSION TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT MATTER FOR SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS.

51. THE SESSION WAS ENDED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT SESSION WOULD TAKE PLACE ON FEBRUARY 10. THE WEST WILL BE HOST FOR THE DISCUSSION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS. RESOR

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